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RCMP History: A Lesson for Rexton?

Oct 20

This is an article that I wrote for the RCMP Gazette following the successful operation at Gustafsen Lake, B.C. in 1995.  I was employed there as a consultant to the RCMP Crisis Management Team.  I offer it now as food for thought:

In writing this article I am attempting to take the process and outcome of the Gustafsen Lake barricade and use it to demonstrate, to crisis managers, a powerful and effective crisis management philosophy. I think sufficient evidence has accumulated from the outcomes of incidents like Oka, Ruby Ridge, Waco, and Ipperwash that we can at least question the process applied during those crises.

It seems that whenever a recalcitrant opponent refuses to come to agreement the natural human tendency is to abandon problem solving and embrace the use of force. That is, to abandon the quest for mutual satisfaction and pursue the path to victory. If the opposition won’t do what we suggest it should, then we’ll force it to do what we think it should.

The expectation behind the use of force is that we will threaten, coerce, or directly apply our force and the opposition will be so impressed they will capitulate, with a new found wisdom for the error of their ways. It is my observation that this rarely happens. Remember the Vietnamese and their response to the American application of force. Observe today in the former Yugoslavia or in Chechnya, the responses of the warring factions to each other’s applications of force. These campaigns serve as models in support of the fact that unless one has a herculean advantage, the opposition usually hardens its resistance in response to an application of force.

Scarcity is a powerful motivator of human behaviour, as any collector can tell you. Whether it’s baseball cards or the paintings of the great masters, the less available the item is the more valuable it becomes. Similarly, when we perceive our rights, control, or freedom being limited, we react by pursuing the threatened option even more, and perhaps even aggressing against who we perceive as the limiting agent. The less freedom, rights, or control we allow the opposition the more valuable it becomes to them and the more aggressively they will pursue it. Force now becomes counterproductive as it has driven the opposition into a defensive position where they will resist us with all they can muster.

The RCMP’s crisis management team (CMT) at Gustafsen Lake anticipated that any early exercise of force would be perceived by the inhabitants of the encampment as an attempt to limit their autonomy. Moreover, this would increase the value of their autonomy, in their own eyes, and result in them pursuing it in an increasingly aggressive manner. The CMT did not want, through their own actions, to harden the resistance of those in the encampment and contribute to the very problem they were attempting to resolve.

The application of force is enveloped in a paradox. The more of it you apply in an effort to make it difficult for the opposition to resist, paradoxically, the more difficult you make it for them to comply by increasing the value of whatever option you limit. Following the application of force the opposition views agreement with increasing reluctance, as embracing it now resembles accepting defeat. Once the strategy of force is deployed there is no turning back. The opposition will have difficulty accepting your efforts to “talk it out” after you have tried to “take them out”. We are now forced, if we are able, to impose a costly solution on our opponent. There is great potential for both sides to emerge as losers, rather than each of us coming out of the disagreement with at least some of what we wanted initially. To paraphrase Mahatma Ghandi, if we continue in the pursuit of an eye for an eye we all end up blind.

Even if the RCMP had successfully assaulted the inhabitants of the Gustafsen Lake encampment, could they have won the war? Have Waco and Ruby Ridge not become the rallying cries for the radical right in the U.S.? To date their names have been associated with at least the bombing in Oklahoma City and the train derailment in Arizona. I think that it is arguable that the RCMP would have destroyed their relationship with the First Nations people and that the latter would have found a way to retaliate when they secured a more powerful position. The eyes of the First Nations people across North America were on Gustafsen Lake. The RCMP showed far more power in vanquishing their opposition before they even took to the battlefield, than they could have, had they undertaken a tactical assault.

The Delicate Balance

The paradox of force itself is not problematic to the management of crisis situations. The problem derives from abandoning, out of frustration, problem solving negotiation and adopting solely the power strategy. The solution lies in utilizing them both. That is, making it easy for the opposition to agree with you at the same time you make it difficult for them to disagree. Making it easy to agree requires maintaining a problem solving negotiation, while making it difficult to disagree requires an exercise of your force. The CMT at Gustafsen Lake did not choose between the two. They executed them both conjointly.

The CMT treated the exercise of force as if it were an integral part of the problem-solving negotiation that was ongoing with the inhabitants of the encampment. They viewed the tactical side of the operation as that part of the balance designed to bring the opposition to the negotiation table. The tactical presence at Gustafsen Lake was utilized to bring the inhabitants of the camp to their senses not to their knees.

Force was used to educate. The people in the encampment refused to reach agreement because they were convinced they could win. The reasoned exercise of force (within the context of a problem solving negotiation) provided them with the opportunity to discover the consequences of no agreement. The RCMP imposed, in a unilateral manner, very little on the people in the encampment. The people, over several weeks, came to a decision, on their own, that was beneficial for both themselves and the RCMP.

Making It Easy To Agree

It is, I believe, the human tendency for us, out of frustration, to threaten and coerce when the opposition fails to see the benefits inherent in agreement. This, of course, most often leads to reactance and resistance, making agreement increasingly difficult. A more productive strategy requires influencing the opposition in the direction we would like it to go.

There were several tactics utilized by the RCMP in making it easy for the inhabitants of the Gustafsen Lake encampment to agree to cease their armed barricade. The CMT had a sure belief that both the surrounding native communities and the inhabitants of the camp had to be involved in the process. Any solution formulated single handedly by the RCMP was likely to be rejected by the First Nations people as they had no hand in crafting it. The CMT realized that problem solving negotiation is not just a mechanical exercise but a political process where both parties work together to shape an agreement. The CMT’s goal was to create a long lasting and effective solution to the problem by providing First Nations involvement in and ownership of that solution. By working together the RCMP and the Shuswap-Okanagan Liaison Group were able to see things differently, make allowances where there had been none, and accept ideas once rejected. For example, the liaison group came to accept that as this was a criminal investigation, the RCMP would have to preserve its position of authority; and, the RCMP came to understand that being flexible enough to incorporate some of the liaison group’s suggestions into their operational plan would increase their chances for success. The process included the CMT working extensively with the Shuswap-Okanagan Liaison Group, who in turn worked with the people in the encampment.

The CMT believed that it was important to satisfy unfulfilled concerns and basic needs. The people in the encampment had deeply rooted needs for recognition, security, identity, and autonomy. If ignored and left unmet these needs could have obstructed agreement. The CMT attempted to meet these needs by providing legal counsel, elders, medicine men, and members of the Shuswap Okanagan Liaison Group. The latter group was able to address several issues of concern to those in the encampment including legal counsel, ongoing community support, and a more effective way of resolving their concerns for aboriginal title in British Columbia.

A vital part of making it easy for the people in the encampment to reach agreement was to provide them with a way to save face. Facesaving lies at the heart of the negotiation process. It is difficult for the opposition to agree with you when they are concerned with how that agreement will make them look to others. The RCMP’s success at Gustafsen Lake had much to do with their ability to save the faces of those in the encampment.

This was accomplished by emphasizing that circumstances had changed since they had embarked upon their armed barricade. Their lawyer had proven himself to be an unreliable vehicle for their aboriginal land title concerns and that some other method would probably increase the chances of their success. Additionally, ample use of third party intermediaries, an effective face saving technique, was made. Proposals that may have been unacceptable coming from the RCMP were far more palatable coming from respected elders and medicine men. The people in the encampment were able to come to agreement not because the RCMP said they must but because a respected member of their own community suggested it.

Finally, in an effort to make it easy to agree, the CMT took their time. They realized that agreement would be difficult for the opposition. Too many decisions and too many changes were being pushed for in too short a time. The CMT simplified the process by breaking it into tasks and then striving for agreement on the easier tasks first. For example, an agreement on a cease fire was established, followed by an agreement to strive for a mutually satisfying solution to the problem well before issues like exchanges and surrender were ever discussed. The CMT relied on the human tendency to infer personal characteristics like attitudes and beliefs from observing our own actions. If the inhabitants of the encampment observed themselves agreeing with the RCMP, even on smaller issues, they would be more likely to view themselves as able to agree with the RCMP on larger issues.

Making It Difficult To Disagree

In utilizing the tactics outlined in the foregoing section the RCMP’s CMT attempted to facilitate agreement for those in the encampment. Of course, as you are aware, the road to agreement was not always smooth. Much of the time those in the armed encampment were motivated more by self satisfaction than they were by mutual satisfaction. The CMT dealt with this by utilizing several tactics to make it as difficult as possible for the opposition to say no.

The negotiating aspect of the CMT assisted here by attempting to increase the opposition’s awareness of the consequences of not reaching agreement. The least provocative way to do this was to let the opposition teach themselves. Questions designed to promote critical thinking and the reality of not reaching agreement, were posed to the opposition (e.g. “How do you think this will be resolved if we don’t come to an agreement?”). The negotiators made direct yet non-threatening statements related to what would probably happen without agreement (e.g. “If we don’t come to some agreement I’m sure we’ll both regret the consequences”).

The tactical aspect of the operation was tasked with demonstrating and utilizing the power of the CMT. Demonstrations of power involved displaying the CMT’s tactical potential without actually deploying it. Demonstrations of power included revealing the armoured personnel carriers, recovering the disabled RCMP vehicle from inside the inner perimeter, and both rotary and fixed wing fly-overs.

As the inhabitants of the encampment persisted in their refusal to come to agreement the CMT was forced to utilize its force. These occasions were always undertaken with the understanding that the more force deployed the more resistance there would be to overcome, and that every modicum of force used should be accompanied by a modicum of conciliation. Therefore next to not using any at all, the optimal tactic was to use as little force as possible to create the maximum effect, and to exhaust all alternatives before escalating. This incremental and exhaustive deployment of force ranged from the tactics of isolation, through the deployment of early warning devices, to the disabling of an opposition patrol vehicle. With each deployment of force the tactical aspect took great care not to provoke the opposition as the CMT’s goal was not to crush them but to influence them toward agreement.

In the continuing effort to avoid provocation, the legitimacy of each exercise of force was ensured. The CMT believed that legitimate (i.e. morally and legally acceptable) uses of force were less likely to provoke opposition resistance and reaction. Legitimate uses of force seemed more impersonal and were less apt to be perceived by the opposition as an unjust attack requiring retaliation. The numerous demonstrations and exercises of RCMP power were viewed by those in the encampment as legitimate and resulted in little or no reaction.

The risk inherent in exercising force is that your exercise may result in an opposition attempt to retaliate and show its own power, or force you to accept its terms. Counterattacking with an offensive action is counterproductive as it is provocative and will result in reactance and hardened resistance. Simply neutralizing the opposition’s attack without striking back is a more effective use of force. Such a neutral use of force is more likely to bring the opposition to their senses and return them to the negotiating table.

There were several examples of retaliatory offensives by those in the encampment being neutralized by different aspects of the CMT. On several occasions immediately preceding and during the barricade tactical members of the CMT were fired upon by inhabitants of the encampment. Immediate action plans exercised extreme control in neutralizing attacks with defensive fire at most. No counterattacks were undertaken.

The inhabitants of the encampment were warned that to stray outside certain boundaries would compromise their safety. On several occasions they ignored the warning and crossed the boundaries looking to retaliate. These forays were neutralized by the technical aspect of the CMT with early warning devices that, in a purely defensive manner, when tripped by the inhabitants, provided a clear and startling demonstration of force.

An outstanding example of neutralizing the opposition’s retaliatory offensives involved an opposition patrol vehicle and three armed inhabitants challenging repeatedly the clearly defined boundaries. This vehicle was neutralized by CMT technicians, on a sortie outside the perimeter, with an in-ground explosive device that left the vehicle disabled and the inhabitants alive. Each of the above-noted events provide an example of a CMT defensive or neutralizing tactic designed to demonstrate force without provoking retaliation.

The CMT at Gustafsen Lake was aware that every crisis takes place within a context. They knew that the negotiation with the inhabitants of the encampment was taking place within a larger community. Moreover, they accepted that there were people from that community who were in a better position to influence the inhabitants toward agreement than the RCMP. Consequently the desire of the Shuswap people to be involved was welcomed by the CMT.

The CMT formed a coalition with the Shuswap-Okanagan Liaison Group. The coalition took advantage of the opposition’s own supportive community. The CMT was aware that the inhabitants of the encampment were not responsive to the RCMP but believed that their community would be. It was then left to the Shuswap-Okanagan Liaison Group as representatives of the community to influence the inhabitants to agree.

The CMT took full advantage of the Shuswap-Okanagan Liaison Group’s relationship with the inhabitants of the Gustafsen Lake encampment, to stop the latter’s attacks and to promote negotiation. The liaison group was utilized as a mediator. They assisted both sides in understanding each other’s interests and suggested options for agreement. The inhabitants of the encampment found it easier to accept the liaison group’s solutions than those offered by the RCMP. And the RCMP was more likely to accept direction from the liaison group than it would have from the inhabitants.

Conclusion

The outcome of the Gustafsen Lake barricade illustrates clearly that the power of law enforcement CMTs should be used as a continuation of problem solving negotiation. The desired outcome is not victory but mutual satisfaction, and force is utilized as a tool to educate not fight. The opponent is advised of the consequences of disagreement through reality testing questions, warnings rather than threats, and if necessary demonstrations of police power. Several thousand years ago the great military strategist Sun Tzu stated “The best general is the one who never fights”. Restating him to suit our purpose we might say, “The best crisis manager is the one who never assaults”.

If forced to exercise power it seems that the least amount of force necessary to influence the opposition back to the negotiating table is optimal. The deployment of force should be unprovocative and any opposition retaliation should be neutralized without counterattack. The CMT should focus on defusing the opposition’s reaction, perhaps through the use of well controlled third party intermediaries, to prevent further attacks and promote negotiation.

The CMT’s power, to forge an agreement, comes not from its ability to impose significant costs on the opposition; but from its ability to contrast the costs of not agreeing with the benefits of agreement. It is the job of the CMT to continually enhance the contrast until the opposition realizes that agreement is the best way to meet their needs.

Dr. Mike Webster, R.Psych.

 

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4 Comments
  1. Anonymous permalink

    Excellent article. Trying to negotiate something myself at the moment. This insight is not only helpful to my own negotiations but helps me to understand why I am being so defiant with certain individuals who I don’t respect and yet can consider the options more clearly when presented by people that I do. Very cool Dr. Mike.

  2. mixer permalink

    Well Doc, I agree but disagree. In all the case’s that you mentioned the other side USED FORCE to gain territory and went on to win the War. For two opposing parting to negotiate both side must want to negotiate. In OKA, (I was there from the very beginning for 1.5 yrs.) the Mohawks did not want to negotiate in good faith as they wore mask at the table. Everyday someone else would show up with different request and solutions whenever an inch was given a yard was taken.. until all the weapons that were used to attack us daily were flown out by plane ( we negotiated that ….) Golf course was never the issue gambling money and cigarette money was behind everything the Golf Course was used to divert everybody’s attention. We were in place in April at St Regis the Golf course issue only surface July 11 when Cpl of the SQ was shoot and Killed by the non aggressive Mohawks.
    Waco Texas had illegal weapons and were selling them without paying taxes, David Koresh had no intentions to negotiate he wanted to do things his way and set fire to the complex so prove his point Killing all.
    Oklahoma City Bombing was said to be reprisal for Waco massacre, Timothy McVeigh, Terry Nichols did not Negotiate before blowing up the FBI daycare facility. Why negotiate for their surrender.

    Fanatics do not want to Negotiate they want to provoke and take things. As for Rexton which is 20 km away they have been blocking roads since June all over the area, they cut down trees, set up camp on the road in order to prevent the Shale gas testing. If society wants to be run by fanatics who is the Police to intervene. We are working for Society not against. 780 thousand person’s in New Brunswick 89 protester’s is far from representing want the public wants or needs. Again the non aggressive First Nation had Molokof Cocktail, and rifles waiting for the RCMP to come in and Negotiate.

    My understanding in this SAD world is that USE OF FORCE is the only way because we show up with intention to talk we get our As_ kicked then the Media is all over us.

    my two cents alone with my cut’s and bruises of 25 yrs of trying to Negotiate with some person’s that don’t want to Talk. lol

    • DJ Motorcop permalink

      You can not negotiate with terrorists and anarchists they make the first move seizing property, blocking roads and disrupting lawful order. I do appreciate the phiodophy behind the article but perhaps it would be more beneficial for the Rexton native group to read it. Perhaps through their puppet masters at the Sierra Club and other groups paying for our natives to protest…………

  3. It all comes to perception. REALLY!!!

    Its very simple. Those in power who have access to the (appropriate resources) required to defeat their enemy will win the war. All that has to be done to stop this is to figure out what (appropriate resources) have been corrupted.

    Without free speech (Canadian Constitution) there would be no wars!! There would be no need. Just get rid of the problem. Problem fixed. I say, lets just tear up the Canadian Constitution and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Who needs them. I trust our Government to look after me and my family. I trust the Government and Police to do their jobs in an honest and ethical way. We don’t need anyone to question any of them on their actions and if someone does dare to question their tactics, then they need to be dealt with if you know what I mean!!! There see, no one will dare argue with this because fear is a powerful tool.

    I would have lost sight of reality if I truly believed this. However, some do believe this and they truly believe that they are doing the right thing. They believe it so much that they will try to influence others in following their lead. WHY??? Because that is what they have been doing for 150 years and no one has dared to speak out for fear of being destroyed by the like minded.

    The day is coming when the Canadian Public will see what is really going on inside the RCMP. I dare say, they will be shocked and horrified once the real stories are told. Although, we have all heard some of those stories there are many many more to come. Some stories, that I believe will rock the very foundation of our beloved Icon the RCMP and its masters.

    Stay tuned

    Rolly Beaulieu

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